THE CHILL BILL:
THE HATE CRIMES PREVENTION ACT OF 2007 AND THE
FORGOTTEN DANGERS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Hank Gates*

I. INTRODUCTION

Not since its decision in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, has the United States
Supreme Court squarely addressed whether hate crimes legislation
regulates protected speech in violation of the First Amendment.1
However, the United States House of Representatives' passage of the
Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007 ("House
Bill 1592" or "Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007") on May 3, 2007
reignited the debate over the First Amendment implications of hate
crimes legislation. 2 The bill represented the most ambitious federal
criminal civil rights legislation in nearly forty years. 3 The Hate Crimes
Prevention Act of 2007 essentially aimed to expand the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to proscribe crimes
motivated by bias based on gender identity, sexual orientation, and
disability. 4 House Bill 1592 in relevant part designated a hate crime as
"willfully caus[ing] bodily injury to any person... because of the actual or
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1. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 479, 490 (1993) (holding that defendant's "First
Amendment rights were not violated by the application of the Wisconsin's penalty-enhancement
provision" which enhanced punishment because defendant intentionally selected his victim based on
race).
2. Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. (as passed
by House, May 3, 2007); David Stout, House Votes to Expand Hate-Crime Protection, N.Y. TIMES,
May 4,2007, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/04/washington/04hate.html.
3. Frederick M. Lawrence, The Evolving FederalRole in Bias Crime Law Enforcement and the Hate
Crimes PreventionAct of2007, 19 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 251,252 (2008).
4. See Christopher DiPompeo, FederalHate Crime Laws and United States v. Lopez: On A Collision
Course to Clarify Jurisdictional-ElementAnalysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 617, 630 (2008); see also H.R.
1592, § 6(a).
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perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender
identity or disability of any person .... ,,5 The proposed legislation
provided for enhanced sentencing for anyone convicted of committing
6
such a bias crime against a member of the enumerated protected groups.
In addition, the bill would excise the language in the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 that limited the operation
of the act to those persons engaged in federally protected activity, such
as voting or attending school. 7 The proposed legislation, therefore,
would vastly expand the application of penalty enhancement for bias
crimes.
Lawmakers and commentators expressed concern about the First
Amendment implications of the bill.8 Some argued that the proposed
statute threatened the freedom of religious leaders to publicly condemn
homosexuality. 9 Representative Louie Gohmert admonished the act and
argued that read in conjunction with federal statutes providing for
accomplice liability, the act would mean:
If a... religious leader teaches or preaches that
homosexuality is wrong or is a sin or someone in the
leader's flock commits a crime against a person who
practices such act, that religious leader may have
counseled
5. H.R. 1592, § 6(a).
6. Id.
7. Stout, supranote 2.
8. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 40-41 (2007). Representatives Lamar Smith, Steve Chabot, Chris
Cannon, Ric Keller, Mike Pence, Tom Feeney, Trent Franks, and Jim Jordan all joined in registering
their dissenting views in the House Judiciary Committee report on House Bill 1592. Id. at 49; see also
Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007: Hearing on HR. 1592 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and HomelandSec. of the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 72
(2007) [hereinafter Hearingon HR. 1592] (statement of Brad W. Dacus, President, Pac. Justice Inst.);
Oren Dorell, Ministers Say Hate Crimes Act Could Muzzle Them; Bill's Backers Say It TargetsAntiGay Crime, Not Words, USA TODAY, June
15, 2007, at 7A, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2007-06-15-hate-crimesN.htm; Barbara Karkabi, HateCrimes Legislation Stirs Pulpit and Podium; Senate-Bill Controversy Centers Mostly on Gender
Identity, Sexual orientation,Hous. CHRON., Sept. 1, 2007, at 1.

9. Eg., H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 39 (2007). The dissenting view in the House Judiciary Committee
Report on House Bill 1592 warned:
[T]he bill raises the possibility that religious leaders or members of religious
groups could be prosecuted criminally based on their speech or protected
activities under conspiracy law or section 2 of title 18, which makes criminally
liable any person who aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures the
commission of the crime . . . .

It is easy to imagine a situation in which a

prosecutor may seek to link 'hateful speech' to causing hateful violent acts. A
chilling effect on religious leaders and others who express their beliefs will
unfortunately result.

2009

THE CHILL BILL

169

or induced under the argument and someday someone will
say so and ministers will be arrested for their preaching. 10
Others feared that the gathering of evidence necessary to prove that a
particular defendant was motivated by bias threatened individuals'
expression or their entertainment of certain views.11 Timothy Lynch
of the Cato Institute argued:
[O]nce hate crime laws are on the books, the law
enforcement apparatus of the state will be delving into
the accused's life and thoughts in order to show that he
or she was motivated by bigotry. What kind of books
and magazines were found in the home? What internet
sites were bookmarked in the computer? Friends and coworkers will be interviewed to discern the accused's
12
politics and worldview.
Conversely, some argued that such reactions by opponents of House
Bill 1592 were alarmist and misplaced. 13 At least one supporter of

10. Hearingon HR. 1592, supranote 8, at 4 (statement ofRep. Louie Gohmert, Ranking Member, H.
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec.).
11. Eg., H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 41 (2007). The dissenting view in the House Judiciary Committee
Report on House Bill 1592 warned:
[I]n prosecuting an individual for a hate crime, it may be necessary to seek testimony relating to the
offender's thought process to establish his motivation to attack a person out of hatred of a particular
group. Members of an organization or a religious group may be called as witnesses to provide
testimony as to ideas that may have influenced the defendant's thoughts or motivation for his crimes,
thereby expanding the focus of an investigation to include ideas that may have influenced a person to
commit a crime of violence.
Id.
12. Hearingon HR. 1592, supra note 8, at 36 (statement of Timothy Lynch, Dir., Project on Criminal
Justice, CATO Inst.).
13. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 15-17 (2007). The House Judiciary Committee Report on
House Bill 1592 dismisses the danger of the chilling effect, stating:
H.R. 1592 is carefully crafted so as to distinguish crimes of violence based on
bias from religious or other expression protected under the first amendment ....
[N]ew section 249(d) prohibits introducing evidence of association or
expression to prove that a crime has been committed, unless it specifically
relates to the offense ....
[D]oubts about the constitutionality of hate crimes
laws were squarely addressed by the Supreme Court in the early 1990's in two
cases, R.A. Vi v. City of St. Paul and Wisconsin v. Mitchell. In Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, the Supreme Court made clear that the first amendment does not
prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to
prove motive or intent. These cases clearly demonstrate that a hate crimes
statute may consider bias motivation when that motivation is directly connected
to a defendant's criminal conduct. By requiring this connection to criminal
activity, this legislation does not chill protected speech and does not violate the
first amendment.
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House Bill 1592 responded that federal accomplice and conspiracy law
contains safeguards protecting free expression. Dean Frederick M.
Lawrence posited:
And the concern that had been raised earlier with
respect to complicity, what about those who give
speeches that others may rely on? Complicity is a wellknown doctrine in the criminal law that requires an
intent to see the crime happen.
There will be no punishment under this statute or any
statute for someone expressing views.
There will
certainly be the potential for punishment for someone
who acts with the intent to see a bias crime happen, and
14
there should be.
Moreover, he argued, "Properly understood, bias crime laws punish
motivation no more than do criminal proscriptions generally." 15
Severity of the penalty often depends on the reprehensibility of a
particular defendant's motive. 16 Dean Lawrence also suggested that the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,
classifying penalty enhancement for bias-motivated crimes as
permissible regulation of non-expressive conduct, 17 foreclosed any First
Amendment objection to the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007.18
Professor Geoffrey R. Stone dismissed religious leaders' fears as
"fanciful" because the legislation "would prohibit only the infliction of
bodily harm and attempts to cause bodily harm" and not "attempts to

Id.; see also Hearing on HR. 1592, supranote 8, at 40 (statement of Frederick M. Lawrence, Dean,
George Washington Univ. Law Sch.) (arguing that limits on accomplice liability mitigate any chilling
effect on religious leaders' preaching against homosexuality). Frederick Lawrence is the author of
PunishingHate: Bias Crimes Under American Law, which examines bias-motivated violence in the
United States. See generally, FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMEs UNDER
AMERICAN LAW (1999).
14. Hearingon HR. 1592, supra note 8, at 40 (statement of Frederick M. Lawrence, Dean, George
Washington Univ. Law Sch.).
15. Lawrence, supranote 3, at 261. Similarly, Congressman Jerrold Nadler argued:
Let us be clear: This is not an issue of free speech. What is covered here are
criminal acts in which the victim is actually harmed and is selected because of
his or her status. The law routinely looks to the motivation of a crime and treats
the more heinous of them differently.
Hearing on HR. 1592, supra note 8, at 2 (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Ranking Member, H.
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec.). The Attorney General of Utah, Mark L.
Shurtleff, also pointed out that penalties frequently depend on the reprehensibility of the motive behind
the crime. Id. at 25 (statement of Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Utah).
16. See supranote 15 and accompanying text.
17. See supranote 1 and accompanying text.
18. Lawrence, supranote 3, at 269-70.
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incite." 19 The Attorney General of Utah, Mark L. Shurtleff, also
dismissed fears that prior speech and associations would constitute
evidence of motive at a prosecution:
[The proposed legislation] specifically states in the rules
of evidence that prosecutors cannot use evidence of
expression, of their associations. They may belong to
hate groups, they may have actually written things
regarding their hatred toward certain groups, but we have
to be able to use those as exact evidence of the crime and
2
the evidence specifically relates to the crime.
Thus, proponents of the bill pointed to numerous safeguards that
would insulate protected expression from the looming chilling effect
that critics feared.
The 110th Congress ultimately failed to enact the proposed
legislation owing to strong opposition from religious conservatives and
antiwar Democrats. 2 1
However, President Obama has identified
strengthening federal hate crimes as a priority of the new
administration. 22 Indeed, the 11lth Congress's House recently passed
House Bill 1913, which revives the proposed hate crime legislation in
23
almost the exact language, and referred the bill to the Senate.
Therefore, debate on the First Amendment implications of the Hate
Crimes Prevention Act will continue.
This comment will address
whether the Hate Crimes Prevention Act is unconstitutionally overbroad

19. Geoffrey R. Stone, The Gospel and Hate Crimes, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2007, at A25.
20. Hearingon HR. 1592, supranote 8, at 114 (statement of Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Utah).
21. Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. (as
referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 7, 2007); Carl Hulse, Congressional
Maneuvering Dooms Hate Crime Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at A26, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/07/washington/07hate.html?scp=3&sq= /22Matthew 02OShepard / 2
0Act22&st-cse; Library of Congress, H.R.1592: All Actions, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?dl 10:HR01592:@@@X (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (showing that House Bill 1592 was
left in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary). Even in the face of strong Congressional support for
the bill, President Bush threatened to veto the bill if it passed. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET,
ExECuTIvE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY: H.R. 1592-LOCAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT HATE CRIMES PREVENTION ACT OF 2007 (May 3, 2007).
Congressional

Democrats attempted to secure the passage of the bill by including it as an amendment to a "mustpass" defense authorization bill. 153 CONG. REC. S12,200 (2007) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
However, the combined opposition of conservatives to the Hate Crimes Prevention Act and of antiwar
liberals to the Iraq War doomed the passage of the bill. Hulse, supra; see also Editorial, Caving in on
Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, at A22.
22. WhiteHouse.gov, Issues: Civil Rights, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/civil-rights (last visited
Nov. 30, 2009).
23. Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, H.R. 1913, 111th Cong. (as
referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Apr. 30, 2009); Local Law Enforcement Hate
Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, H.R. 1913, 11lth Cong. (as passed by House, Apr. 29, 2009).
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in violation of the First Amendment because it threatens to chill
protected speech. Part II will outline the text of the House Bill 1592 as
passed by the House of Representatives.24 Part III will outline the
United States Supreme Court's overbreadth doctrine in its current form
and the Supreme Court's major decisions on hate crime legislation in the
past. Part IV will evaluate the potential dangers that the Act, in its
current form, poses to protected speech. Ultimately, this comment
concludes that Congress can draft hate crimes legislation to avoid
chilling protected speech; however, lawmakers and legal commentators
have been overly dismissive of the threats that the Act poses in its
current form.
II. TEXT OF THE HATE CRIMES PREVENTION ACT OF 2007
The drafters of House Bill 1592 attempt to preempt First
Amendment objections by creating a buffer zone for protected
expression.
The bill purportedly limits the punishable offense to
criminally violent conduct that "willfully causes bodily injury to any
person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, or an explosive or
,,25
incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily injury to any person ....
Thus, superficially at least, the proposed legislation extends only to
unprotected conduct-physically harming or attempting to harm
another person.2 6 However, the language limits the application of the
penalty enhancement provision to crimes motivated by the "actual or
perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender
identity or disability" of the victim. 2 7 Motive constitutes the key
element of the offense.28 Therefore, the language essentially requires
federal prosecutors to gather and introduce evidence on the defendant's
24. Since the language of House Bill 1913 incorporates the language from House Bill 1592, this
analysis is relevant to the current debate before Congress. See supra note 23 and accompanying text;
compare Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, H.R. 1913, 11 1th Cong. (as
referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Apr. 30, 2009), with Local Law Enforcement Hate
Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. (as passed by House, May 3,2007).
25. H.R. 1592, § 6(a). The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly emphasized that
violence or other types of expressive conduct receives no First Amendment protection when it results
in harm independent from the impact of the message. E.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484
(1993) (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984)).
26. See H.R. 1592, § 6(a); cf Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484 ("[O]ur cases reject the view that an
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the
conduct intends thereby to express an idea. Thus, a physical assault is not by any stretch of the
imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.") (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
27. H.R. 1592, § 6(a).
28. See id.
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mental state. 29 Critics of the proposal fear this motive element will
necessitate intrusive investigations into defendants' prior speech or
entertainment of ideas about protected groups. 30 Such critics fear that
the unavoidable introduction of such evidence could chill protected
speech about the immorality of homosexual behavior by inducing selfcensorship. 31 In other words, individuals might eschew engaging in such
protected speech for fear that it could be used against them if they are
charged with a hate crime in the future. 32 The bill, however, contains
several provisions designed to mitigate this constitutional objection.
House Bill 1592 contains a "Rule of Evidence" provision stating, "In
a prosecution for an offense under this section, evidence of expression
or associations of the defendant may not be introduced as substantive
evidence at trial, unless the evidence specifically relates to that
offense. '33 Supporters of the bill argue that this provision mitigates the
danger of the chilling effect by prohibiting the introduction of
defendants' statements or associations that are remote in relation to the
criminal act. 34 However, the practical effect of this provision depends
largely on judicial construction of the phrase "specifically relates to that
offense. '35 Courts could read the phrase to mean that only expressions
with a close temporal and spatial proximity to the criminal act may be
introduced to prove motive. Under that reading, epithets or bigoted
statements made during or just prior to the violent act would be
admissible. On the other hand, courts could interpret the phrase as

29. Id. In addition, any prosecution under the act must be based on "reasonable cause to believe that
the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender
identity, or disability of any person was a motivating factor underlying the alleged conduct of the
defendant .. ." Id.
30. Hearing on HR.1592, supra note 8, at 36 (statement of Timothy Lynch, Dir., Project on Criminal
Justice, CATO Inst.);
H.R.REP.No.110-113, at41 (2007)("For example, in prosecuting an individual
for a hate crime, it may be necessary to seek testimony relating to the offender's thought process to
establish his motivation to attack a person out of hatred of a particular group. Members of an
organization or a religious group may be called as witnesses to provide testimony as to ideas that may
have influenced the defendant's thoughts or motivation for his crimes, thereby expanding the focus of
an investigation to include ideas that may have influenced a person to commit an act of violence. Such
groups or religious organizations may be chilled from expressing their ideas out of fear of involvement
in the criminal process.")
31. See H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at41 (2007).
32. See id. at 41 ("Ultimately, a pastor's sermon concerning religious beliefs and teachings could be
considered to cause violence and will be punished or at least investigated ....Religious teachings and
common beliefs will fall under government scrutiny, chilling every American's right to worship in the
manner they choose and to express their religious beliefs.").
33. H.R. 1592, § 6(a).
34. Eg., Hearing on HR. 1592, supra note 8, at 114 (statement of Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen.,
Utah); Lawrence, supranote 3, at 270.
35. H.R. 1592, § 6(a).
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simply requiring that statements must relate to the particular victim's
protected group to be admissible. Under that reading, remote ideological
statements and associations that reflect antipathy toward a particular
group would be admissible. Therefore, the scope and efficacy of this
36
protective mechanism remains unclear.
In addition, the bill contains a "Rule of Construction" provision
providing, "Nothing in this Act... shall be construed to prohibit any
expressive conduct protected from legal prohibition by, or any activities
protected by the free speech or free exercise clauses of, the First
Amendment to the Constitution. ' 37 Supporters have, likewise, pointed
to this provision as insulating protected expression on the immorality of
homosexual behavior from prosecution. 3 However, such arguments are
somewhat spurious. The potential danger to the First Amendment
derives not so much from the bill's direct prohibition of protected
expression, but from the danger of self-censorship induced by the
prospective introduction of evidence to prove motive for criminal
conduct. 39
Thus, the bill's overbreadth depends on the scope of
protected expression that prosecutors may introduce at trial to prove
motive. 40 The United States Supreme Court's current First Amendment
overbreadth jurisprudence and the Court's hate crimes decisions provide
an instructive starting point in considering this issue because they
proscribe constitutional boundaries for regulations that affect protected
expression.

III.

THE SUPREME COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE

A. The Overbreadth Doctrine
The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine "vindicate[s] the
precision principle"-the requirement that government regulation of
speech be designed to attain a permissible end and not infringe more

36. But see Lawrence, supra note 3, at 270 (arguing that the United States Supreme Court's
jurisprudence does not require the "Rule of Evidence" limitation for the Hate Crimes Prevention Act
to be constitutional).
37. H.R. 1592, § 8.
38. E.g., Stone, supranote 19 (arguing that this provision provides additional protection for freedom of
speech and religion, disposing of fears that the proposed legislation will criminalize preaching against
homosexuality); see also H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 15-16 (2007).
39. See H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at41 (2007).
40. See supranotes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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protected speech than necessary. 4 1 The underlying policy of the
overbreadth doctrine supposes that sweeping regulations of speech deters
protected expression because speakers fear they will fall within the
restriction and be subject to criminal penalty. 42 In Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a person
prosecuted for unprotected expression under a permissible regulation
may still claim facial overbreadth and challenge the law on its face
because "the possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected
speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected
speech of others may be muted .... ,,43 The Court has generally applied
the overbreadth doctrine to strike down a law when it determines that
the "law has no 'core' of applications that are legitimate under the First
Amendment .... ,,44 In Broadrick, the Court stated that it would find
overbroad laws facially unconstitutional "unless a limiting construction
or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or
deterrence to constitutionally protected expression. '45 However, the
Court emphasized that the facial overbreadth doctrine attenuates as the
regulation moves away from pure speech toward conduct. 46 The Court
also emphasized that the overbreadth must be substantial to justify facial
47
invalidation of the statute.
In subsequent cases, the Court refined the Broadrick principles into a
more coherent analysis. The Court held, in City of Houston v. Hill, that
the initial task is to determine whether the statute "'reaches a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct."'' 48 Laws that
reach a substantial amount of protected expression or conduct may be
49
facially invalidated, notwithstanding particular lawful applications.
However, the Court cautioned that single possible or hypothetical
instances of frustration of protected speech would not sustain a facial
challenge. 0 The Court's holdings in Broadrick and Hill have limited
application to the Hate Crimes Prevention Act. The core application
41. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST
AMENDMENT § 3.06[1] (1994).

42. Id. § 3.06[2][a]; Note, The FirstAmendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 853
(1970).
43. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,612 (1973).
44. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 3.06[2][b][ii].
45. Broadrick,413 U.S. at 613.
46. Id. at 615.
47. Id.
48. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987) (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982)).
49. Id. at 459.
50. Id. at 458.
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of the statute in Broadrick imposed neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions on political speech.51 In Hill, the core application of the
statute, which prohibited all speech that interrupted a police officer in
52
any manner, constituted impermissible regulation of protected speech.
The Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007 poses a more difficult
overbreadth question because at its core it applies to unprotected
conduct-the infliction of bodily harm.5 3 However, the Act necessitates
the use of speech as evidence to prove bias motive.5 4 Therefore, the
proposed legislation has a legitimate core application, and the danger of
overbreadth is more subtle. The Court's major decisions on the
constitutionality of hate crimes legislation may prove more instructive
because they address statutes with core applications similar to those of
House Bill 1592. These decisions define the overbreadth analysis as
applied to penalty enhancement statutes.
B. The United States Supreme Court's Hate Crime Jurisprudence
1. R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul
The Court's initial consideration of hate crimes statutes seemed to
signal disapproval of such regulations as a direct content restriction on
protected expression. In R. A. V v. City of St. Paul, the Court
considered whether St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance violated
the First Amendment. 55 The ordinance provided, "'Whoever places on
public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti... which... [he] has reasonable grounds to
know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor."'56 The city charged the petitioner under the
ordinance for burning a cross in a yard across the street where an African
American family lived. 57 The petitioner moved to dismiss the charge on
the ground that the ordinance constituted an invalid content restriction
51. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 616-17. The statute at issue in Broadrick prohibited certain classes of
government employees from engaging in any kind of political campaigning. Id. Therefore, it was not
censorial of particular viewpoints in violation of the First Amendment. See id. at 616-18.
52. Hill,482 U.S. at 462-63 (finding that since the statute prohibited all speech that interrupted an onduty police officer in any manner, it was directed at constitutionally protected speech).
53. Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. § 6(a) (as
passed by House, May 3, 2007).
54. Id.
55. R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992).
56. Id. (quoting ST. PAUL, M1NN., STAT. § 292.02 (1990)).
57. Id. at 379.
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in violation of the First Amendment. 58
The Supreme Court of
Minnesota sought to save the ordinance by construing its application to
only expressive conduct that amounts to fighting words. 59 Accepting
that construction as authoritative, the Supreme Court of the United
States proceeded to consider the constitutionality of the ordinance as
construed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota.6"
The Supreme Court of the United States held the St. Paul ordinance
facially unconstitutional as a content-based restriction on protected
expression. 61 The Court prefaced that the First Amendment as a general
rule prohibits government from criminalizing speech based on nothing
more than disapproval of its content. 62 However, government may
impose content-based restrictions on certain discrete categories of
speech, such as fighting words, "because of their constitutionally
proscribable content... ."63 Nevertheless, government cannot prohibit
only certain types of fighting words based on content unrelated to the
overall proscribable content. 64 In other words, while government can
prohibit fighting words, it cannot do so based on disapproval of the
underlying ideas communicated through such speech. 65 Within the
proscribable category of fighting words, government cannot discriminate
on the basis of content. 66 The St. Paul ordinance singled out only
fighting words expressing bias on the basis of race, gender, or religion,
essentially silencing certain select ideas. 67 In sum, prohibitions within
proscribable categories of speech cannot suppress particular messages
based on content, because such prohibition constitutes viewpoint
68
discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.
The Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007 does not run afoul of R. A.

58. Id. at 380.
59. See In re Welfare ofR. A. V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991), rev 'dsub nom. R. A. V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
60. R.A. V, 505 U.S. at381.
61. Id. ("[W]e nonetheless conclude that the ordinance is facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits
otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses.")
62. Id. at 382.
63. Id. at 383 (emphasis in original). The Court, however, dismissed the theory that categories such as
fighting words did not constitute speech at all and instead adopted the notion that such categories
present exceptions to the general rule that government may not proscribe speech based on disapproval
of the content. Id. at 383-84. These categories are proscribable under the First Amendment precisely
because of the content. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 386.
66. Id. at 384.
67. Id. at 393-94.
68. Id. at 392.
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V so long as it is construed as a restriction on entirely unprotected
conduct rather than as a restriction on a proscribable category of
speech.69 Thus, its supporters have repeatedly argued that the Act
regulates criminal conduct. 70 However, at least one commentator has
argued that penalty enhancement statutes constitute direct regulation on
bigoted expression based on nothing more than disapproval of such
72
expression. 71 Such a restriction runs afoul against R. A. V
2. Wisconsin v. Mitchell
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a
Wisconsin hate crimes statute containing a penalty enhancement
provision for crimes motivated by bias. 73 The facts of the case are
particularly instructive because they illustrate the typical instance in
which the Hate Crimes Prevention Act would apply. A group of young
African American males, including the defendant, Mitchell, had gathered
outside an apartment complex and were discussing the movie
"Mississippi Burning. ' 74 After discussing a scene from the movie in
which a Caucasian man assaults an African American boy, Mitchell asked
the emotionally charged group, "Do you all feel hyped up to move on
some white people?" 75 Subsequently, the group spotted a young
Caucasian male walking. 76 Mitchell then stated, "You all want to fuck
somebody up? There goes a white boy; go get him. '77 The group
approached the Caucasian male and severely beat him, leaving him in a

69. See H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 16-17 (2007) ("[D]oubts about the constitutionality of hate crimes
laws were squarely addressed by the Supreme Court in the early 1990's in ...R. A. V v. City of St.
Paul ....[This] case[] clearly demonstrate [s]
that a hate crimes statute may consider bias motivation
when that motivation is directly connected to a defendant's criminal conduct. By requiring this
connection to criminal activity, this legislation does not chill protected speech and does not violate the
first amendment.").
70. Id. at 15 ("H.R. 1592 is carefully crafted so as to distinguish crimes of violence based on bias
from religious or other expression protected under the first amendment. The legislation does not
prohibit name-calling, verbal abuse, or other forms of negative or hateful expression; it prohibits only
violent actions that result in death or bodily injury."); see also Hearing on HR. 1592, supranote 8, at 2
(statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Ranking Member, H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Sec.) ("Let us be clear: This is not an issue of free speech. What is covered here are
criminal acts in which the victim is actually harmed and is selected because of his or her status.").
71. Steven G. Gey, What ifWisconsin v. Mitchell Had Involved Martin Luther King, Jr.? The
ConstitutionalFlaws of Hate Crime EnhancementStatutes, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1014, 1040 (1997);
see infra Part V.A.
72. See supranotes 64-66 and accompanying text.
73. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1993).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 480.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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coma for four days. 7 8 A jury convicted Mitchell of aggravated battery
which, by Wisconsin statute, normally carried a maximum sentence of
two years' imprisonment.7 9 However, the jury found that Mitchell had
intentionally selected the victim on the basis of race. 80 Section 939.645
of the Wisconsin Statutes allowed enhancement of penalties for certain
crimes when "the defendant '[i]ntentionally selects the person against
whom the crime.., is committed... because of the race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that
person .... "'81 Under section 939.645, Mitchell could be sentenced to a
maximum of seven years' imprisonment, and the circuit court imposed a
sentence of four years' imprisonment. 82 Similar to House Bill 1592, the
Wisconsin statute provided for enhanced penalties based on motive and
83
included sexual orientation in the enumeration of protected groups.
However, unlike House Bill 1592, the Wisconsin statute was not limited
84
to crimes of "bodily injury" but encompassed property crimes as well.
Mitchell appealed his conviction, arguing that the penalty enhancement
85
provision violated the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed Mitchell's conviction,
holding that the Wisconsin hate crimes penalty enhancement
"violate[d] the First Amendment directly by punishing what the
legislature ha[d] deemed to be offensive thought. ' 86 Rejecting the
State's argument that the statute merely punished conduct-the actual
selection of the victim-the court found that the statute punished the
reason for the selection, essentially punishing bigoted thought. 87 In
addition, the court held that the statute was overbroad because the
prosecution would have to introduce evidence of prior protected speech,
such as racial epithets, that the defendant may have used well before the
actual offense. 88 The use of such evidence threatened to chill the speech
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing WIs. STAT. §§ 939.50(3)(e), 940.19(lm) (1989-90)).

80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Wis. STAT. § 939.645(1)(b) (1989-90)).
82. Id. at 480-81 &n.1 (citing WIs. STAT. § 939.645(2)(c) (1989-90)).
83. Compare Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. §
6(a) (as passed by House, May 3, 2007), with Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (1989-90).
84. Compare Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. §
6(a) (as passed by House, May 3, 2007), with Wis. STAT. § 939.645(1)(b) (1989-90).
85. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at481.
86. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Wis. 1992), rev'd 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 812, 815. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin relied on the United
States Supreme Court's recent decision in R. A. V v. City of St. Paul,which held that state and local
governments could not impose content restrictions on bigoted speech. Id. at 814-15; see supra Part
III.B.1.
88. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 816.
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of those who feared future prosecution under any of the prescribed
offenses.8 9 The court, thus, based its holding on reasoning strikingly
similar to that of House Bill 1592's critics. 9
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered a brief opinion for a unanimous
Court. 91 The Court initially recognized that, strictly construed, the
Wisconsin statute punished only conduct. 92 Moreover, the Court
recognized that the First Amendment does not protect certain types of
conduct, such as physical violence, that inflicts direct harm independent
of the communicative impact of the message. 93 However, the Court
acknowledged that this rule did not dispose of Mitchell's First
Amendment challenge. 94 The statute punished conduct more severely
based on the defendant's motive and viewpoint. 95 Therefore, the statute
encompassed not only pure conduct, but also an expressive element
connected to the defendant's mental state. 96 The Court observed,
however, that courts traditionally consider the defendant's motive for
committing an offense as one crucial sentencing factor among others. 97
Therefore, the statute did not differ substantially from sentencing
enhancements under substantive criminal law. 98 While a sentencing
judge cannot consider a defendant's abstract beliefs, he may consider the
motive underlying the offense in question. 99 The Court noted that the
89. Id.
90. H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 39-41 (2007).
91. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 477,479 (1993).
92. Id. at 484.
93. Id. (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 485.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 485-86.
99. Id. (citing Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 167 (1992)). In Dawson, the defendant, Dawson,
escaped from prison, burglarized a house, brutally murdered the resident, and stole the resident's car.
Dawson, 503 U.S. at 160-61. A jury convicted Dawson of first-degree murder. Id. at 161. At the
penalty stage of his trial, the prosecution introduced evidence that Dawson was a member of the
Aryan Brotherhood and submitted his white supremacist tattoos as proof Id. at 161-62. Subsequently,
Dawson challenged the admission of this evidence on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 160. The
Court held that the sentencing judge could not consider evidence of Dawson's membership in a white
supremacist group because it proved only his abstract beliefs. Id. at 165-66. The Court held that the
introduction of this evidence violated Dawson's First Amendment rights. Id. at 165-68. While the
prosecution could introduce a wide range of evidence at sentencing, Dawson's association with the
Aryan Brotherhood had no relevance to the substantive crime. Id. at 165-66. This evidence was
inadmissible on First Amendment grounds because there was no indication that bias toward a certain
identifiable group motivated Dawson to commit the murder. Id. Therefore, the Court essentially
articulated a relevance test for determining whether evidence of association at the penalty phase
violated the First Amendment. See id. Evidence of abstract beliefs as opposed to motive for a
particular act ran afoul of the First Amendment. See id.
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First Amendment does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to
prove motive."' ° On the contrary, the use of prior statements to prove
motive and intent is common practice. 10 1 In addition, the Court noted
that the penalty enhancement statute operates in the same fashion as
federal antidiscrimination laws. 10 2 The Court concluded that the statute
proscribed bias-inspired conduct and not speech. 103 Thus, the Court
10 4
disposed of the argument that the statute directly regulated speech.
The substantive criminal offense punishing actual conduct subsumed the
penalty enhancing statute. 105 The Court, thus, implied that the statute
required a close nexus between bias motivation and the substantive
conduct offense. 106
The Court then proceeded to consider whether the Wisconsin statute
was overbroad due to its chilling effect on protected bigoted speech. 107
This challenge to the statute posited that the statute would induce selfcensorship by individuals who feared penalty enhancement if they might
commit one of the substantive offenses proscribed by the statute. 108
The possibility that their past speech and associations could result in a
stiffer penalty would deter them from expressing bigoted ideas protected
by the First Amendment. 109 The Court swiftly dismissed this argument,
reasoning, "The sort of chill envisioned here is far more attenuated and
unlikely than that contemplated in traditional 'overbreadth' cases." 110
The idea that a citizen would suppress his unpopular ideas for fear that
he might later commit a serious crime was simply too hypothetical to
justify a finding of overbreadth. 111 Implicit in the Court's dismissal of
the overbreadth argument was the fact that the penalty enhancement

100. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 489.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 487. "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, makes it unlawful for an
employer to discriminate against an employee 'because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin."' Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a)(1) (2006)) (emphasis in original).
103. Id. at 487-88. The Court distinguished its recent decision in R. A. V by emphasizing that the
statute in the R. A. V case regulated pure speech. Id. at 487 (citing R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 392-94 (1992)).
104. See id. at 487-88.
105. See id. at 484-88.
106. Lawrence, supra note 3, at 267 ("The Court then held that, because the bias motivation would
have to have a close nexus with the specific criminal act, there was little risk that the statute would
chill protected bigoted speech. The statute focused not on the defendant's bigoted ideas, but rather on
his actions based on those ideas."); see also, Stone, supranote 19.
107. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 488.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at488-89.
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would only come into play in the context of serious offenses, and the
possibility of committing a serious offense was too remote and
improbable to work any real chilling effect. 112 Moreover, because the
statute required a nexus between bias-motivation and the criminal act,
any chilling effect on protected speech would be minimal.1 13 Thus, the
Court concluded that the penalty enhancement provision did not violate
114
any of Mitchell's First Amendment rights.
Supporters of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007 frequently
cite to Mitchell as foreclosing further debate on whether such penalty
enhancements for hate crimes violate the First Amendment.1 15 They
argue that Mitchell authoritatively establishes that the introduction of
expression to prove bias motive does not chill protected expression.1 16
However, the Court's brief disposal of the issues in Mitchell fails to
adequately address important First Amendment concerns and contains
critical theoretical flaws. 117 Most crucially, the Court underestimated
the true potential of penalty enhancement provisions to chill protected
expression.118
3. Virginia v. Black
Unlike Mitchell, the Court's more recent decision in Virginia v. Black
did not address the constitutionality of a penalty enhancement statute
for bias-motivated crimes. Rather, Black considered a First Amendment
challenge to Virginia's statute banning cross-burning with the intent to
intimidate. 119 Although the statute at issue was a content restriction as
opposed to a penalty enhancement provision, 12 the case provides
important insight on two levels. First, the Court again considered a hate
121
crime with a motive element implicating the First Amendment.

112. See id.
113. See id. at489-90.
114. Id. at 490.
115. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 17 (2007) ("In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court made
clear that the first amendment does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements
of a crime or to prove motive or intent. Th[is] case[] clearly demonstrate [s] that a hate crimes statute
may consider bias motivation when that motivation is directly connected to a defendant's criminal
conduct. By requiring this connection to criminal activity, this legislation does not chill protected
speech and does not violate the first amendment."); Lawrence, supranote 3, at 266.
116. Eg., H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 17 (2007).
117. Gey, supranote 71, at 1014-15; see infra Part IV.
118. See generally Gey, supranote 71; see infra Part IV.C.
119. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347 (2003).
120. Id. at 348 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996)).
121. Id. at 347 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996)).
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Second, the plurality opinion applied the overbreadth doctrine in a more
stringent manner than previously known. 122
Because of the nature of the underlying offense, the facts are less
relevant to consideration of House Bill 1592. In separate trials, juries
convicted respondents Black, Elliot, and O'Mara of violating a Virginia
statute banning cross-burning with the intent to intimidate any person or
group. 123 Black had burned a cross at a Ku Klux Klan rally held near a
public highway, and the Commonwealth charged Black under the
statute. 124 At trial, the court instructed the jury that "intent to
intimidate means the motivation to intentionally put a person or group
of persons in fear of bodily harm. ' 125 The trial court also instructed the
jury that it could infer intent to intimidate from the act of cross-burning
by itself.126 Black objected to this instruction on First Amendment
grounds. 127 Elliot and O'Mara had burned a cross in the yard of Elliot's
African-American next-door neighbor. 128 The trial court similarly
instructed the jury that it had to find intent to intimidate through the
act of cross-burning; however, it did not instruct the jury that they could
infer that intent from the act itself.129
The Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated the cases and reversed,
finding the statute facially unconstitutional. 130 The court found the
statute indistinguishable from that invalidated by the Supreme Court of
the United States in R. A. V 131 Additionally, the Supreme Court of
Virginia found the provision within the statute allowing the crossburning itself to constitute prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate

122. Id. at 365-67 (plurality opinion).
123. Id. at 348-51.

124. Id.at 348-49.
125. Id. at 349.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 350.
129. Id. at 351.
130. Black v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 764, 768, 553 S.E.2d 738, 740 (2001), aff'd in part,rev'd in
partsub nom. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
131. Id.at 772, 553 S.E.2d at 742; see supraPart III.B.1. The Virginia Supreme Court reasoned, "The
Virginia cross burning statute is analytically indistinguishable from the ordinance found
unconstitutional in R.A.V ....While a statute of neutral application proscribing intimidation or threats
may be permissible, a statute punishing intimidation or threats based only upon racial, religious, or
some other selective content-focused category of otherwise protected speech violates the First
Amendment .. . . In this case, the Commonwealth seeks to proscribe expressive conduct that is
intimidating in nature, but selectively chooses only cross burning because of its distinctive message.
As the Court in R.A.V succinctly stated: 'the government may not regulate use based upon hostilityor favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed."' Black, 262 Va. at 772-74, 553 S.E.2d at
742-44 (quoting R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992)).
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unconstitutionally overbroad due to its chilling effect. 132 The Supreme
Court of the United States undertook review of the Supreme Court of
133
Virginia's decision.
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court; however, a
portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Black garnered only a
plurality. 134 The Court prefaced that the First Amendment generally
prohibits governments from imposing content regulations on speecheven distasteful speech. 135 The Court, thus, echoed the underlying
principle stated in R. A. V136 However, the Court recognized limited
categories of speech that governments may lawfully restrict because
they are "'of such slight social value.., that any benefit... is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.' ' 137 The Court
identified "true threats" as one of these limited categories of
unprotected speech. 138
True threats constitute communications in
which the speaker threatens violence to someone so as to put him in
fear. 139 On this basis, the Court upheld the constitutionality of banning
cross-burning with the intent to intimidate. 140 In so doing, the Court
effectively converted the Virginia statute from a content restriction on
a specific message to a statute criminalizing conduct based on a
particular motivation. 141
Thus, the Court silently reaffirmed the
principle articulated in Mitchell that state action could reach certain
motivations. 142 The restriction in the Virginia statute encompassed not
143
a particular expressive view, but a content neutral motivation.
The plurality also considered the Supreme Court of Virginia's finding

132. Id. at 777, 553 S.E.2d at 746.
133. Black v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 764, 553 S.E.2d 738 (2001), cert. granted, 535 U.S. 1094
(2002).
134. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 346-47 (2003) (showing that Justice O'Connor "delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V"
which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Stevens, and Justice Breyer).
135. Id. at 358.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 358-59 (quoting R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992)). The Court has long
recognized these lesser protected categories of speech. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
138. Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
139. Id. at 359-60.
140. Id. at 362-63.
141. Id. at 361-63. In this way, the Court distinguished its holding from that in R. A. V Id. at 362; see
supra Part III.B.1. Unlike the statute in R. A. V., which banned certain speech based on offensive
racial content, the Virginia statute criminalized speech impelled by a particular motivationintimidation. Black, 538 U.S. at 361-62; see supraPart III.B.1.
142. Black, 538 U.S. at 361; see supraPart III.B.2.
143. Black, 538 U.S. at 362.
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that the Virginia statute was unconstitutionally overbroad due to its
provision that "'[a]ny such burning of a cross shall be prima facie
evidence of an intent to intimidate.... "'144 This provision essentially
relieved the prosecution of the burden to produce evidence of
motivation.145 The plurality reasoned that this provision essentially
dispensed with the motive element, converting the statute into a naked
146
content restriction and rendering the statute unconstitutional.
147
Moreover, this provision raised the danger of the chilling effect.
While individuals may burn crosses to intimidate, they may also do so to
convey ideological or political messages. 148 The prima facie evidence
provision created the "possibility" that the government would
"prosecute-and potentially convict-somebody engaging only in lawful
political speech at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to
protect." 149 The statute, thus, dispensed with circumstantial evidence
necessary to prove that the motivation underlying the act of crossburning was intimidation. 15 0
In holding the statute overbroad, the plurality perceptibly expanded
the overbreadth doctrine as applied in Mitchell.15 1 The conjectural
possibility that individuals would self-censor protected speech for fear of
prosecution was enough for the plurality to find overbreadth.1 12 This
enhancement of the overbreadth doctrine did not escape Justice Scalia
who, in his dissent, chastised the plurality for justifying the application
of the overbreadth doctrine on mere possibilities. 15 3 Ultimately, the
Court in Black reaffirmed that governments may punish bias-motivated
crimes consistent with the First Amendment. 15 4 Moreover, the plurality
signaled an increasing sensitivity to the potential chilling effect of such
statutes and a greater willingness to expand the application of the

144. Id. at 363 (plurality opinion) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996)).
145. Id. at 364 (quoting Black v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 764, 778, 553 S.E.2d 738, 746 (2001), aff'd
inpart,rev 'd inpartsub nom. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)).
146. See id. at 365.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (emphasis added).

150. Id. at 367.
151. See id. at 365; supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
152. Black, 538 U.S. at 365.

153. Id. at 373 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia also objected, "We have never held that the mere threat
that individuals who engage in protected conduct will be subject to arrest and prosecution suffices to
render a statute overbroad. Rather, our overbreadth jurisprudence has consistently focused on
whether the prohibitory terms of a particular statute extend to protected conduct .

(emphasis in original).
154. Id. at 361 (majority opinion).

Id. at 371
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155
overbreadth doctrine.

Testifying before the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security, Dean Lawrence cited Black, as well as Mitchell, for
the proposition that punishing crimes motivated by bigotry is consonant
with the First Amendment. 156 However, Black presented a distinctive
situation because it concerned a restriction on a narrow category of
expressive conduct motivated by the intent to intimidate rather than a
penalty enhancement for non-expressive criminal conduct motivated by
bias. 157 In addition, House Bill 1592's supporters who share Lawrence's
view may discount the new rigor that the Black plurality introduces into
the overbreadth doctrine. 158 Nevertheless, regardless of the Court's hate
crime precedent, penalty enhancements like those found in the Hate
Crimes Prevention Act of 2007 pose First Amendment dangers which
the Court has not yet squarely addressed.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DANGERS OF PENALTY ENHANCEMENT
STATUTES

A. The Inconsistent Theory that Hate Crimes Are Not Direct
Regulations on Speech
Penalty enhancement statutes remain problematic even after Mitchell
because the Court failed to resolve crucial First Amendment problems
with such legislation. 159 The Court's holding that the Wisconsin statute
did not directly regulate speech poses problems. 161 In reaching this
holding, the Mitchell Court conflated two mutually exclusive-and
equally problematic-legal conceptions of the hate crimes statute at
issue. 161 One conception views the substantive criminal offense and the

155. See id. at 365 (plurality opinion).
156. Hearing on HR. 1592, supra note 8, at 39-40 (statement of Frederick M. Lawrence, Dean,
George Washington Univ. Law Sch.) ("[1]n Wisconsin against Mitchell, a unanimous Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a bias crime law. And why? Because, as Chief Justice Rehnquist said,
we are not punishing thoughts. We are punishing action. We are not punishing expression. We are
punishing the acting on those expressions in a violent way. Similarly, when the Supreme Court upheld
the cross burning statute in Virginia, in Virginia against Black, the court said that one may focus on
act, not on expression of ideas."); see also Lawrence, supranote 3, at 268-70.
157. Compare Black, 538 U.S. at 347-48, with Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act
of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. (as passed by House, May 3, 2007).
158. See supranotes 151-55 and accompanying text.
159. See Gey, supranote 71, at 1014-15; supraPart.III.B.2.
160. See supranotes 103-04 and accompanying text.
161. See Gey, supranote 71, at 1025.
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defendant's bias-motivation as a single act of conduct unprotected by
the First Amendment.162 The other views the substantive criminal
conduct and the motivation as two distinct acts. 163 The Mitchell Court
inconsistently embraced both views, and with that conflation, the Court
struggled to distinguish expression of motivation from fully protected
expression of thought and find that the state could punish motivation
because it was not speech at all. 164 This same theoretical inconsistency
165
is present in Black.
The Mitchell Court initially denied the First Amendment challenge by
arguing that the Wisconsin statute punished not expression but violent
conduct that received no First Amendment protection. 166 Under this
"one act" conception of the hate crime, the motivation for the criminal
act essentially becomes subsumed within the act itself.167 In a sense,
Mitchell's racist motivation, as signified by his speech, became so
168
intertwined with the assault that it became part of that same crime.
Thus, the speech becomes punishable because the theory transforms it
into unprotected conduct. 169 The Court justifies this conception by
arguing that the penalty enhancement statute merely allows sentencing
judges to account for motive and is, therefore, no different than other
substantive crimes. 170 The flaw in this "one act" conception is that a
penalty enhancement statute in reality treats the defendant's speech as a
separate punishable act.171 To prove bias-motive, prosecutors must
introduce evidence that is entirely distinct from the evidence of the
substantive crime. 17 2 This is the very origin of the potential chilling
effect.173 While evidence of the substantive crime focuses solely on
physical acts, evidence of motive focuses entirely on the defendant's

162. See id.
at 1025-34.
163. See id.
at 1034-36.
164. Id. at 1015, 1020; see infra notes 166-198 and accompanying text.
165. See supranotes 134-50 and accompanying text.
166. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) ("[O]ur cases reject the view that an apparently
limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct
intends thereby to express an idea .... Thus, a physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment." (internal citations and quotations omitted));
see also id. at 487 ("But whereas the ordinance struck down in R. A. V. was explicitly directed as
expression.., the statute in this case is aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment.").
167. Gey, supranote 71, at 1024-26.
168. See id.
at 1025.
169. Id. at 1024.
170. Id. at 1026; see Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 485 (drawing an analogy between enhancing penalties for
assault based on racist motive and enhancing the penalty for murder committed for pecuniary gain).
171. Gey, supranote 71, at 1025-26.
172. Id.
173. See supraPart.11I.A.
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speech and associations. 7 4 These two qualitatively different kinds of
proof militate against the "one act" concept. 175
Supporters of penalty enhancement statutes might respond that
evidence of a murder and evidence of pecuniary motive are also
qualitatively different in that evidence of such motive will focus on
speech and financial history as opposed to acts. 17 6 However, evidence
of pecuniary motive or the brutal nature of a particular crime pertains to
ideologically neutral social interests-deterring those similarly situated
and assessing the future danger posed by the defendant. 177 Conversely,
enhancing the penalty based on evidence of prior bigoted speech is not
ideologically neutral; rather, it reflects society's general disapprobation
of such views. 178 Yet, the R. A. V Court made clear, shortly before
Mitchell, that "[t]he First Amendment generally prevents government
from proscribing speech or even expressive conduct because of
disapproval of the ideas expressed." 179 Indeed, the Mitchell Court stated
that a statute may not enhance penalty merely because of the
defendant's abstract beliefs.180 The Court has generally only allowed the
criminalization of conduct linked to speech when the action results in
distinct nonideological criminal consequences.18 1 The Mitchell Court
paid some homage to this notion by arguing that bias-motivation
produced distinct social harms such as retaliatory crimes, community
unrest, and emotional trauma.1 8 2
However, these nonideological
justifications for enhanced penalty presume that the perpetrator's
motives will be immediately apparent to both the victim and the wider
community.1 8 3 While that may be the case in many bias crimes, the
penalty enhancement statutes certainly encompass more subtle biasmotivated crimes as well.1 8 4
Thus, penalty enhancement punishes
bigoted expression.185 This conclusion leads to an equally problematic
"two act" conception of such statutes.
The Mitchell Court also recognized

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

the alternative

Gey, supranote 71, at 1025-26.
Id.
See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 485, 489 (1993).
Gey, supranote 71, at 1029-30.
See id. at 1030.
R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 485.
Gey, supranote 71, at 1030 & n.109 (citing R. A. V., 505 U.S. at 385).
See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-88.
Gey, supranote 71, at 1044.
Id.
Id. at 1034.

"two

act"
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conception that the statute prohibited two independent acts of
unprotected conduct-the underlying violent crime and the actual
selection of the victim based on bias. 86 To support this conception, the
Court drew an analogy between the Wisconsin statute and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.187
The Court posited that, like the
Wisconsin penalty enhancement, Title VII punishes the defendant's
discriminatory motive by making it unlawful for employers to treat
employees unequally "'because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."' 188 The Court's clear implication was that the
two provisions' parallel use of the language "because of' essentially
rendered them legally indistinguishable in operation. 189 Indeed, the Hate
Crimes Prevention Act of 2007 also uses the language "because of the
actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,
gender identity or disability of any person ....
-190
While superficially
similar, the practical operation of the two statutes proves different.191
In Title VII, the language "because of' refers to the ultimate illegal
act-discriminatory
employment
practices.1 92
Absent
the
discriminatory motive, standard employment practices such as hiring
and firing are not unlawful.1 93 The language, thus, does not single out
additional unlawful conduct; rather, it defines the single act that the
statute prohibits. 194 In contrast, in penalty enhancement statutes, the
motivation does not define the ultimate criminal act-bodily violence;
rather, that act is criminal in itself without more. 195
The phrase
"because of' refers to the subjective reasons for which the defendant
committed an acknowledged crime. 196 Thus, the hate crime comes
unhinged from the substantive offense and becomes, in practice, a
prohibition on bigoted expression. 197
R.A.V. expressly rejected

186. Id. at 1035, 1037; see Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487.
187. Gey, supranote 71, at 1036; see Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487.
188. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006)) (emphasis original). The
Court pointed out that its precedent expressly held that Title VII did not violent the First Amendment
rights of defendant employers. Id. (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984)).
189. See id. at 480, 487 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006); Wis. STAT. § 939.645(1)(b)

(1989-90)).

190. Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. § 6(a) (as
passed by House, May 3, 2007) (emphasis added).
191. Cf Grey, supranote 71, at 1039.
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1039-40.
196. Id. at 1040.
197. Id.
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punishment of speech merely on the basis of discriminatory content. 198
Both the "one act" and the "two act" explanation as to why penalty
enhancement statutes do not constitute direct regulation on speech are
subject to doubt. 199 Recognizing these weaknesses, both the Mitchell
Court and proponents of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007
compensate by combining the two separate theories. 2°0
Thus, the
Mitchell Court implicitly recognized the requirement of a close nexus
between the bigoted expression and the substantive crime. 20 1 The close
linkage of the two incorporates elements of the "one act" and "two act"
conception; while the bias motivation is a separate crime, it is close
20 2
enough to the prohibited conduct to justify regulation.
Recognition of this theoretical problem may have prompted the
Black Court to reject the concept of cross-burning as unprotected
conduct and, instead, classify the conduct as a category of unprotected
speech. 20 3 Yet, Black presents a similar problem. Because the Court
recognized that cross-burning as a statement of ideology would receive
First Amendment protection, the Court essentially allows the state to
punish motivation-the intent to intimidate. 20 4 Supporters of House
Bill 1592 also point to Mitchell's close nexus theory, incorporated into
House Bill 1592's Rule of Evidence provision, as a mechanism for
mitigating the chilling effect. 205
This argument poses additional
problems because the close nexus theory still fails to adequately insulate
protected expression.
B. The Minimal Danger Posed by Conspiracy and Accomplice Liability
While the proposed legislation poses a real danger of chilling
protected speech, it does not do so in the manner many legislators fear.
During the debate over House Bill 1592's passage, legislators argued that
the provisions threatened the freedom of religious leaders to preach the
immorality of homosexual behavior. 20 6 They posited that the Hate

198. R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992).
199. See supranotes 166-198 and accompanying text.
200. Gey, supranote 71, at 1042.
201. Id; supranote 106 and accompanying text.
202. See Gey, supranote 71, at 1042.
203. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 n.2 (2003).
204. See id. at 363.
205. See, e.g., Hearingon HR. 1592, supranote 8, at 114 (statement of Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen.,
Utah); H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 15-16 (2007); cf Lawrence, supranote 3, at 267.
206. Eg., Hearing on HR. 1592, supra note 8, at 3-4 (statement of Rep. Louie Gohmert, Ranking
Member, H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec.); H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 41
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Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, operating in conjunction with other
federal statutes providing for general conspiracy and accomplice
liability, would criminalize such protected expression. 20 7 In particular,
Representative Louie Gohmert voiced concern that clergy who vocally
opposed homosexuality could be convicted of aiding and abetting violent

crimes

committed

by

members

of their

congregation

against

homosexuals. 20 8
Brad W. Dacus, President of the Pacific Justice
Institute, raised similar concerns. 209 Federal conspiracy and accomplice
liability statutes could implicate religious leaders in the substantive
offense of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act. 210 However, because the
federal judiciary has narrowly limited the operation of such statutes,
these fears are largely misplaced.
Federal courts have held that

conspirators must coordinate the object and essential plan of the
conspiracy. 211 Moreover, an individual must share the criminal intent of
the substantive offender to be a co-conspirator. 21 2 Similarly, to be liable

as an accomplice, an individual must participate in a crime and intend to
achieve its object. 213 In addition, the Supreme Court's decision in
Brandenburgv. Ohio accords significant First Amendment protection of
speech, even to advocacy of violent force. 214 These safeguards dispose
of one potential chilling effect on free expression.
1. Potential Liability Under Conspiracy Law
Although few legislators specifically referenced it in debate, the

general federal statute criminalizing conspiracy to violate laws of the

(2007) ("Ultimately, a pastor's sermon concerning religious beliefs and teachings could be considered
to cause violence and will be punished or at least investigated. Once the legal framework is in place,
political pressure will be placed on prosecutors to investigate pastors or other religious leaders who
quote the Bible or express their long-held beliefs on the morality and appropriateness of certain
behaviors. Religious teachings and common beliefs will fall under government scrutiny, chilling every
American's right to worship in the manner they choose and to express their religious beliefs.").
207. Eg., H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 39,41 (2007).
208. Hearingon HR. 1592, supranote 8, at 3-4 (statement ofRep. Louie Gohmert, Ranking Member,
H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec.) ("One other aspect that is not usually
discussed will come in the new law would be applied along with Article 18 U.S. Code Section 2(a) of
the Federal criminal code that says, 'Whoever aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures a
crime commission is punishable just as if he is the principal."'); see also H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 39
(2007).
209. See Hearingon HR. 1592, supra note 8, at 124 (statement of Brad W. Dacus, President, Pac.
Justice Inst.).
210. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371 (2006).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenblatt, 554 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 692 (1975).
213. See, e.g., Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949).
214. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (per curiam).
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United States presents one possible threat to religious leaders'
expression. 215 Federal criminal conspiracy law provides, "If two or
more persons conspire... to commit any offense against the United
States... and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object
of the conspiracy, each shall be fined.., or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both. ' 216 Under this language, the issue becomes whether a
religious leader's vigorous preaching against the evils of homosexuality
to a member of his congregation can unwittingly result in a conspiracy
to violate the Hate Crimes Prevention Act. If so, and a congregation
member did commit an overt act of violence against a homosexual, then
the religious leader would be liable as a co-conspirator. However, this
outcome is highly improbable because merely preaching the evils of
homosexual behavior does not satisfy the necessary elements of
217
conspiracy as set forth by federal courts.
In applying federal conspiracy law, the Supreme Court of the United
States and lower federal courts have repeatedly reaffirmed that "the
218
essence of a conspiracy is 'an agreement to commit an unlawful act."'
Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the policy justification
underlying the crime of conspiracy is the unique danger to society arising
from the agreement to commit unlawful acts. 2 19 Agreement constitutes
the very danger against which the crime of conspiracy seeks to
protect.221 Therefore, to be a co-conspirator, a religious leader's
preaching would have to constitute at least a tacit agreement with their
congregation members to do violence to homosexuals. However, courts
have also strictly defined agreement in the conspiracy context.
Agreement requires a "'meeting of minds"' between two or more
individuals. 22 1 Co-conspirators must reach some common ground as to

215. Opponents of House Bill 1592 referred to conspiracy liability intheir dissenting views included in
the House Judiciary Committee report on that bill. H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 38 (2007).
216. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006).
217. See supranotes 215-34 and accompanying text.
218. United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 274 (2003) (quoting lannelli v. United States, 420
U.S. 770, 777 (1975)) (emphasis added); e.g., Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1959);
Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1954); United States v. Rosenblatt, 554 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir.
1977); United States v. Mendez, 496 F.2d 128, 129 (5th Cir. 1974); Marino v. United States, 91 F.2d
691, 694 (9th Cir. 1937).
219. lannelli, 420 U.S. at 778 (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961))
("'[C]ollective criminal agreement-partnership in crime-presents a greater potential threat to the
public than individual delicts. Concerted action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object
will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart
from their path of criminality."').
220. See Callanan,364 U.S. at 593.
221. Rosenblatt, 554 F.2d at 38 (quoting Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
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the object of the conspiracy and the essential nature of the plan to
achieve that object. 222 A general understanding that the parties will
engage in unspecified illegal conduct in the future is not sufficient for an
agreement. 223 Thus, in United States v. Rosenblatt, the Second Circuit
held that the defendant could not be liable for conspiracy to defraud the
224
federal government for allegedly engaging in money laundering.
While the defendant and the substantive offender had in fact agreed to
225
defraud the government, the defendant believed the checks were valid.
Therefore, the defendant and the substantive offender had reached
merely a general understanding that they would violate the law and had
not contrived the essentials of a plan. 226 By contrast, in United States v.
Grassi, the Fifth Circuit held the defendant liable for conspiracy because
he not only agreed to commit the offense in principle, but also
negotiated the actual details for the purchase of a controlled substance
with undercover agents. 227 Thus, while a formal oral contract is not
necessary, some active coordination and participation as to the actual
details of the criminal undertaking is required for an agreement. 228 Mere
knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of another's criminal act does not
229
render one a co-conspirator.

The requirement that the parties actively coordinate the criminal
object of the conspiracy and the plan for reaching that objective
insulates religious leaders who merely preach the immorality of
homosexual behavior and coordinate no specific plan with their
congregation members to inflict bodily harm. A congregation member
who translates abstract beliefs about the evil of homosexuality into a
motive to commit violent acts against homosexuals reaches no
agreement with his minister as to criminal object. Even if the religious

222. Id. at 38-39 (citing Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947)).
223. Id. at 39; see also United States v. Grassi, 616 F.2d 1295, 1301 (5th Cir. 1980).
224. Rosenblatt,554 F.2d at 37-39.
225. Id. at 37-38 ("Our difficulty with [the defendant's] conviction arises from the lack of any
agreement between him and [the substantive offender] concerning the type of fraud in which they
were engaged. It is clear that [the substantive offender] was defrauding the United States by
obtaining payment for government checks which he had caused to be printed without authorization.
The government stipulated, however, that [the defendant] did not know the truth about [the substantive
offender's] activities .... In other words, both men agreed to defraud the United States, but neither
agreed on the type of fraud.").
226. Id. at 38.
227. Grassi,616 F.2d at 1302.
228. United States v. Mendez, 496 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1974); see also United States v. Bavers, 787
F.2d 1022, 1027 (6th Cir. 1985).
229. Mendez, 496 F.2d at 130.
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leader expressly advocates violence against homosexuals,
coordination or plan for achieving the shared object would exist.

no

The requirement of agreement between the parties closely relates to
another crucial limitation on conspiracy liability-intent. A person
cannot conspire to commit a particular substantive crime without
exhibiting the requisite level of criminal intent for that underlying
offense. 230 Therefore, a person cannot be liable as a conspirator unless
the prosecution proves that his intent was coextensive with that of the
substantive criminal actor. 231
To convict a religious leader of
conspiracy to violate the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, a prosecutor
would have to demonstrate that he had specific intent to inflict bodily
injury on a particular victim. Moral disapprobation of homosexuality
hardly signifies intent to inflict bodily harm. In addition, the Supreme
Court of the United States emphasized that a person cannot demonstrate
intent if he had no knowledge of the criminal design of the substantive
criminal actor. 232 Therefore, a religious leader who had no knowledge
that a congregation member acted on his preaching by attacking a
homosexual cannot share the member's criminal intent. Supporters of
the Hate Crimes Prevention Act have argued that this intent
requirement provides ample safeguard for religious leaders' protected
expression condemning homosexuality. 233 In sum, the agreement and
intent elements that courts have recognized in applying federal
conspiracy law substantially reduce the potential that the Hate Crimes
Prevention Act will expose

religious leaders to conspiracy
234
homosexual behavior.

liability

merely

for

condemning

230. Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678 (1959); see United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 692
(1975).
231. Ingram, 360 U.S. at 678.
232. Id. (quoting Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943)) ("'Without the
knowledge, the intent cannot exist."').
233. See, e.g., Hearingon HR. 1592, supranote 8, at 40 (statement of Frederick M. Lawrence, Dean,
George Washington Univ. Law Sch.) ("Complicity is a well-known doctrine in the criminal law that
requires an intent to see the crime happen. There will be no punishment under this statute or any
statute for someone expressing views. There will certainly be the potential for punishment for
someone who acts with the intent to see a bias crime happen, and there should be.").
234. See id.
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2. Potential Liability Under Accomplice Law
Opponents of House Bill 1592 also repeatedly voiced concerns that
the proposed legislation exposed religious leaders to federal accomplice
liability. 235 The general accomplice liability statute provides, "Whoever
commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal. '236 Unlike in a conspiracy, aiding and abetting does not
require proof of agreement between the parties. 237 However, as with
conspiracy law, in applying accomplice liability the federal judiciary has
incorporated limitations that serve to insulate protected expression. To
be liable as an accomplice under the statute, an individual must associate
himself in some way with the criminal undertaking, participate in it, and
238
intend that it succeed.
In United States v. Tarr, the First Circuit held that the defendant's
delivery of a single illegal firearm did not result in liability because there
was no evidence he participated in the principals' undertaking to engage
in the selling of firearms for profit. 239 In United States v. Martinez, the
Fifth Circuit found that the defendant had sufficiently associated himself
with the sale of narcotics by following the principal to the exchange
240
point and keeping a lookout a short distance away in his car.
Therefore, knowledge of the criminal undertaking and some active
participation are necessary. 241 Moreover, to participate in the crime,
the individual must perform some affirmative act designed to facilitate
its commission. 242 To satisfy the definition of accomplice liability, the
individual must consciously assist the principal in committing the crime
in some active way. 243 Mere association with the substantive criminal
actor is an insufficient basis for accomplice liability. 244 Therefore, in

235. See, e.g.,
Hearing on HR. 1592, supra note 8, at 3-4 (statement of Rep. Louie Gohmert, Ranking
Member, H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec.).
236. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2006).
237. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11
(1954).
238. United States v. Garcia-Geronimo, 663 F.2d 738, 743 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing Nye & Nissen v.
United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949)); United States v. Tarr, 589 F.2d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 1978) (citing
Nye & Nissen, 336 U.S. at 619); United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1269, 1272 (5th Cir. 1977).
239. Tarr, 589 F.2d at 59.
240. Martinez, 555 F.2d at 1272.

241. See supranotes 238-40 and accompanying text.
242. See id.
243. United States v. Dickerson, 508 F.2d 1216, 1217-18 (2d Cir. 1975) (citing Nye & Nissen, 336 U.S.
at 619).
244. Martinez, 555 F.2d at 1271.
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Tarr, the mere fact that the defendant knew the principals did not prove
that he was privy to their plan.245 Similarly, in United States v.
Dickerson, the Second Circuit found that the defendant's mere presence
during his criminal associates' assault on a federal agent did not warrant
accomplice liability because the defendant had not intended, by his mere
presence, to participate in the crime. 246 By contrast, in Martinez, the
defendant clearly intended his presence to assist in the crime because he
247
served as a lookout.
Moreover, the substantive crime must be a natural and foreseeable
result of the individuals' actions for accomplice liability to attach. 248 As
with conspiracy, the accomplice must also share the criminal intent of
the principal as to the substantive crime. 249 The requirements of
foreseeability and intent to commit the substantive offense serve as
important safeguards for the protected expression of clergy. 250 An
unknowing priest cannot be an accomplice if a congregation member
transforms vocal opposition to homosexuality into a motive to commit
violence against homosexuals.
In such a situation, intent and
foreseeability are absent as to the priest.
Moreover, courts have incorporated certain First Amendment
safeguards into accomplice and conspiracy law to provide furthers
safeguards against liability for speech. Courts have held that an
individual's speech can constitute participation in a criminal venture
through counseling, advising, or encouraging the criminal act. 251 The
First Amendment does not immunize an individual from accomplice
liability simply because he used words to further the principal's
commission of a crime. 252 However, the courts have carefully delineated
between protected advocacy and speech that essentially forms part of
unprotected criminal conduct; unlike the abstract advocacy of crime,
specific advice and detailed instructions as to how to commit a particular

245. United States v. Tarr, 589 F.2d 55, 60 (1st Cir. 1978).
246. Dickerson, 508 F.2d at 1218-19. The defendant had engaged in a conspiracy to sell an illegal
firearm to an undercover agent and was present when his confederates assaulted the agent. Id. at
1217.
247. Martinez, 555 F.2d at 1272.
248. United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 1982); Dickerson, 508 F.2d at 1218 (citing
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 648 (1946)).
249. Tarr, 589 F.2d at 59; United States v. Barclay, 560 F.2d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1977).
250. See supranote 233 and accompanying text.
251. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)); Barnett,667 F.2d at 841-42.
252. Rice, 128 F.3d at 243-44; Barnett,667 F.2d at 842-43.
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offense result in accomplice liability. 2 3 In other words, generally
encouraging others to commit a crime does not constitute participation
in the criminal venture, but providing individuals with specific details as
to how to achieve the criminal object in a particular set of circumstances
does satisfy accomplice liability. 25 4 Therefore, a religious leader cannot
participate in a violent crime against a homosexual merely by expressing
the abstract belief that homosexuality is wrong or-in the more extreme
case-by advocating bodily violence to homosexuals. Unless a religious
leader provides specific instructions as to how to inflict bodily injury in a
particular case, he has not counseled or advised the substantive criminal
255
actor as required under accomplice liability.
In the context of accomplice liability for violent crimes, the Fourth
Circuit has incorporated the Supreme Court of the United States'
analysis in Brandenburgv. Ohio to make this subtle distinction between
protected speech and speech that satisfies accomplice liability. 25 6 In
Brandenburg, the Court considered whether the Ohio Criminal
Syndicalism statute violated the First Amendment. 2 7 That statute made
it unlawful to "'advocat[e]... the duty, necessity, and propriety of crime,
sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing industrial and political reform"' or to "'voluntarily
assembl[e] with any society... formed to teach or advocate the doctrines
of criminal syndicalism.' 25 8 The defendant, a leader in the Ku Klux
Klan, was convicted under the statute for appearing at a rally at which
he advocated various acts of violence towards blacks and Jews. 25 9 The
Court found that the Ohio statute's blanket prohibition on advocating
criminal violence violated the First Amendment. 261 States cannot
constitutionally criminalize the abstract advocacy or encouragement of
the use of force or violating the law unless the speaker intends such
261
advocacy to incite immediate, imminent violation of the law.
Therefore, the mere abstract advocacy of resorting to violence

253. Rice, 128 F.3d at 246; Barnett,667 F.2d at 842-43 (citing United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619,
624 (8th Cir. 1978)); Robinson v. United States, 262 F.2d 645, 650-51 (9th Cir. 1959). For example, in
Buttorff, the Eighth Circuit held the defendants liable for aiding and abetting tax evasion by holding a
meeting at which they instructed others on specific ways to avoid paying their taxes as opposed to
simply advocating that others not pay their taxes. Buttorff,572 F.2d at 624.
254. See supranote 253 and accompanying text.
255. See id.
256. Rice, 128 F.3d at 243-44.

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

395 U.S. 444,444-45 (1969).
Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (West 1969) (repealed 1971).
Id. at 444-47.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 447.
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constituted protected expression under the First Amendment. 26 2 By
incorporating the Brandenburg rule into accomplice liability
jurisprudence, lower courts have espoused the principle that while mere
abstract teaching or advocacy to violate the law does not result in
263
accomplice liability, "'speech brigaded with action"' does.
In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, the Fourth Circuit considered whether
imposing accomplice liability in a civil suit against a publisher for
wrongful death violated the First Amendment. 264 The defendant had
published a book entitled Hit Man: A Technical Manualfor Independent
Contractors,which instructed readers in specific, intricate detail how to
effectively commit the crime of murder for hire.265 Having read this
266
manual, James Perry brutally murdered the plaintiffs' decedents.
Perry acted as a contract killer hired by a victim's ex-husband. 267 In
committing the substantive crime, Perry followed the manual's specific
instructions to the letter. 268
Significantly, the defendant publisher
stipulated that it knew and intended that criminals seeking instruction on
how to commit murder for hire would obtain and use the manual. 269 The
defendant even acknowledged that it had in fact assisted Perry in
committing the murders by publishing the book. 270 The defendant
clearly shared the criminal intent of the principal. 27 1 However, the
defendant argued that the First Amendment presented an absolute bar to
accomplice liability based on expression. 27 2 The Fourth Circuit held that
the First Amendment did not bar liability because it does not immunize
speech constituting aiding and abetting.27 3 While the Brandenburg
holding accords protection to abstract advocacy of violent action,

262. Id.
263. E.g, Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Brandenburg,395
U.S. at 456 (Douglas, J., concurring)); United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 1970).
264. Rice, 128 F.3d at 241.
265. Id. at 235-41. The manual described in gruesome, graphic detail how to commit the crime of
murder for hire including: how to effectively kill with knives, firearms, and explosives; how to remove
the serial number on the weapon to avoid detection; how to alter the ballistic markings of a firearm to
avoid detection; how to effectively torture a person in order to extract information; how to construct a
bomb out of fertilizer; how to make arson appear accidental; how to dispose of a body; and how to
cope with the psychological effects of killing. Id. at 235-39.
266. Id. at 239.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 241.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 242-43.
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speech that essentially functions as "legitimately proscribable
nonexpressive conduct" receives no such protection. 27 4 Speech, in other

words, receives no protection when it forms an integral part of a
crime. 275

The court proceeded to define this distinction between

27 6
protected advocacy and speech that forms part of criminal conduct.
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit stated that general, abstract, or

theoretical advocacy of violation of the law receives First Amendment
protection and cannot result in accomplice liability. 277
However,
specific, concrete factual instructions designed to assist the principal to

accomplish a particular crime receive no protection and can lead to
accomplice liability. 27 8
279
Rice approvingly.

Subsequent federal court decisions have cited

Under the uniformly accepted principles articulated in Rice,28° a
religious leader would never be subject to accomplice liability for mere

abstract, theoretical preaching about the reprehensibility of homosexual
behavior. Indeed, a religious leader would never be subject to accomplice

liability for expressly advocating violent acts against homosexuals.
Rather, only specific, detailed instructions intended to assist
congregation members in inflicting bodily injury against homosexuals in
a particular set of circumstances would lead to such liability. A priest
would have to advise parishioners in graphic, mechanical detail how
exactly to violate the Hate Crimes Prevention Act to be liable as an

accomplice.

Preaching

that homosexuality

is immoral remains

thoroughly insulated from prosecution. Ultimately, those who argue
that the proposed legislation threatens to chill the protected speech of

274. Id. at 243.
275. Id. (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)).
276. Id. at 243-45.
277. Id. at 246 (quoting United States v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 215, 217 (1985)).
278. Id. To support this distinction, the court cited numerous cases involving accomplice liability for
tax fraud in which courts found liability because the defendants had provided specific instructions on
how to prepare false tax reports. Id. at 244-46 (citing United States v. Fleschner, 98 F.3d 155, 158-59
(4th Cir. 1996); Kelley, 769 F.2d at 217; United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 552-53 (9th Cir.
1985)).
279. E.g., Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found. for Relief& Dev., 291 F.3d 1000, 1019
n.14, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding the First Amendment did not prohibit attaching liability to an
organization for funding terrorist activity as long as the organization knew about the terrorist activity,
desired to help it, and engaged in some act to help it); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d
429, 434, 447 n.19 (2nd. Cir. 2001) (holding that the First Amendment did not immunize the
communication of instructions for hacking computers); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp.
2d 1264, 1280-81 (D. Colo. 2002) (dismissing a wrongful death suit against video game and movie
entertainment companies for the deaths of students in a school shooting because plaintiffs did not
allege that the companies shared the intent of the principals).
280. Rice, 128 F.3d at 245 (stating that the concept that specific instructions receive no First
Amendment protection is uniformly accepted).
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religious leaders fail to comprehend the carefully designed safeguards
incorporated into the criminal law. 28 1 However, the chilling effect
looms as another threat.
C. The Real Threat of the Chilling Effect
The Hate Crimes Prevention Act threatens to chill the protected
expression of those who fear prosecution under the substantive offense.
Congress incorporated the close nexus requirement of Wisconsin v.
Mitchell into the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007 by including a
rule of evidence section providing: "In a prosecution for an offense
under this section, evidence of expression or associations of the
defendant may not be introduced as substantive evidence at trial, unless
the evidence specifically relates to that offense. '282 Supporters of the
bill argue that this provision in conjunction with Mitchell confines
admissible evidence to speech that is temporally or causally related to
the criminal offense. 283 Under this construction, presumably epithets or
bigoted language directed at the victim during or just prior to the violent
act would be admissible; however, remote ideological statements in the
past would not. This construction rests on the assumption that such
proximate statements would be probative of motive, making it
consistent with the Mitchell holding that penalty enhancement punishes
motive, not conduct. 284
Individuals, therefore, will not suppress
protected ideological speech because they need not fear that it will be
introduced as evidence in any future prosecution. 285 However, this
argument rests on a very narrow construction of the phrase "specifically
relates to that offense. 2 86
One reading of this phrase suggests that the speech must be closely
287 It
related in time and space to the criminal act to be admissible.
would, therefore, limit the introduction of expression to epithets or
hateful speech used during the actual physical attack. However, another
reading suggests that the speech merely must be causally related to the

281. See supraPartIV.B.
282. Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. § 6(a) (as
referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 7, 2007); see supra note 106 and
accompanying text.
283. E.g., Lawrence, supranote 3, at 270; James Weinstein, Hate Crime and Punishment:A Comment
on Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 73 OR. L. REv. 345, 378-79 (1994).
284. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-89 (1993).
285. See id. at 488-89.
286. H.R. 1592, § 6(a).
287. See supranote 283 and accompanying text.
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selection of the specific victim. 288 It could merely mean, for instance,
that in a trial of a defendant for a hate crime committed against a
homosexual, the prosecution cannot introduce evidence that the
defendant is a white supremacist or an anti-Semite; however, the
defendant's remote statements on the deplorability of homosexual
behavior could still be admissible, because they are probative of the cause
of the particular crime. The House Judiciary Committee Report on
House Bill 1592 openly admits that the rule of evidence provision allows
for the introduction of this sort of remote evidence:
This provision also recognizes, however, that evidence
of an accused's speech, expression, or association may be
properly relevant and not unfairly prejudicial if such
evidence can be shown to be related to the crime at issue.
An isolated racial slur remote in time to the charged
offense, or merely incidental to the motive of the
charged offense (for example, a racial slur uttered in the
conduct of a robbery where robbery is manifestly the
motive), or mere participation in an organization that
holds and professes strong and negative views toward a
given group, would presumably be excluded. In contrast,
an accused's violence-themed set of statements
displaying animus toward the victim's group, or
statements evidencing hatred of a given group, persisting
over a lengthy period, especially if close in time to the
alleged offense, may indicate the motivation for the
offense and properly be admissible as evidence-if there
is other independent evidence of the accused's
participation in the crime. This careful weighing of
relevance against prejudice will help ensure an individual
is not prosecuted simply for holding and expressing
289
views, no matter how abhorrent.
Therefore, supporters of House Bill 1592 certainly envision gathering
290
evidence on defendants' past ideological statements and associations.
"If hate crime prosecutions become common, and if prosecutors
routinely introduce into evidence defendants' bigoted statements uttered
long before the crime, as well as defendants' membership in bigoted
organizations, it is far from speculative to posit a chilling effect on

288. H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 16 (2007).
289. Id.
290. Id.
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protected speech. '291 The House Judiciary Report cites the increasing
incidence of hate crimes as the underlying justification for the
legislation. 292 The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") received
reports of more than 113,000 hate crimes since 1991.293 The FBI, in
294
fact, received reports of 7,163 bias-motivated crimes in 2005 alone.
295
Moreover, such crimes have probably been underreported in the past.
If hate crimes are so widespread, then presumably prosecutions under the
Hate Crimes Prevention Act would be commonplace and well-known.
Ordinary people, therefore, might have good reason to fear prosecution
under the statute in the future-application of the state will be
widespread. Additionally, the argument that future prosecution for a
hate crime is too remote and conjectural is flawed because the statutory
language proscribes not only the calculated, heinous attacks, but also the
more spontaneous interracial brawls that may erupt at a bar or on the
street. 296 Some individuals may find themselves literally thrust into a
hate crime situation. As the temporal connection between speech and
the specific violent act becomes more attenuated, the chilling effect
297
grows more threatening.
The difficulty of proving subjective motivation to a jury further
increases the grave danger that federal courts and prosecutors will resort
to remote speech or associations as proof to enhance penalties. 298 The
problem that prosecutors will inevitably face is that epithets uttered
during the actual commission of the alleged crime will frequently lack
much probative value as to the defendant's true motive; since most biasmotivated crimes are quickly escalating street encounters instead of
calculated acts of brutality, proving that the defendant intentionally
selected the victim based on race, sexual orientation, or sexual identity
becomes difficult. 299 In such a spontaneous context, a defendant may
hurl an epithet at a homosexual during the criminal act, not because he
has selected the victim based on his sexual orientation, but because he is
overcome by anger and wishes to inflict additional emotional harm on
291. Weinstein, supranote 283, at 376.
292. H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 6 (2007).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Anthony S. Winer, Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the Constitution,29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
387, 408-09 (1994) (arguing that three factors contribute to under-inclusive data: underreporting,
difficulty determining motivations, and skewed subjective perceptions of those reporting).
296. See H.R. 1592, § 6(a); Weinstein, supranote 283, at 376-77.
297. Weinstein, supranote 283, at 378.
298. See Marc Fleisher, Down the Passage Which We Should Not Take: The Folly of Hate Crime
Legislation,2 J.L. & POL'Y 1, 9-11 (1994).
299. Id. at 11.
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the victim through verbal insults. 300 No doubt, many defendants would
mount such a defense to penalty enhancement at trial, and such
30 1
expression would remain protected under the holding of R.A. V

The Supreme Court of Florida recognized this difficulty in
interpreting Florida's bias-crime penalty enhancement law in State v.
Stalder.30 2
In Stalder, the court considered a First Amendment
challenge to the Florida statute, which provided, "The penalty for any
felony or misdemeanor shall be reclassified as provided in this subsection
if the commission of such felony or misdemeanor evidences prejudice
based on the race, color, ancestry, ethnicity, religion, or national origin
of the victim. ' 30 3 The court outlined the then recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in R.A. V and Mitchell and considered which
was more applicable to the statute at issue. 30 4 Because the Florida
statute potentially proscribed two different kinds of conduct, the court
concluded that the Florida statute contained elements similar to both the
St. Paul ordinance struck down in R.A. V and the Wisconsin penalty
enhancement statute upheld in Mitchell.305
The statute proscribed
crimes committed against a particular individual because of his
membership in a particular group, punishing motive. 30 6 Mitchell upheld
this application because it essentially punished conduct-the selection of
the victim. 307 However, the statute also proscribed crimes where the
defendant selected his victim based on neutral criteria such as anger or
jealousy but exhibited bias in the manner in which he committed the
crime. 30 8 The defendant, for instance, may use a racial epithet during
the actual commission. 309 In that application, the statute proscribed
only selected expression based on content in contravention of the rule
in R.A.V 310 Ultimately, the court saved the statute by limiting it only

300. See id. at 15.
301. See supraPart III.B.1.

302. See State v. Stalder, 630 So. 2d 1072, 1076 (Fla. 1994).
303. Id. at 1073-74 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 775.085(1) (1989)). In its essential nature the statute
proves similar to the Hate Crimes Prevention Act. Compare H.R. 1592, § 6(a), with FLA. STAT. §
775.085(1) (1989).
304. Id. at 1074-75.
305. Id. at 1076.
306. Id.
307. Id.; see Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993).
308. Stalder, 630 So. 2d at 1076.
309. Id.
310. Id.; see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992).
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to the former application. 311 This case illustrates that the introduction
of statements close in time to the criminal act may not be probative,
and that certain applications of penalty enhancement statutes may run
312
afoul of R.A.V.
In the context of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, because proximate
statements such as epithets may not be probative, the government would
have to introduce further evidence to show the epithet signified
selection based on sexual orientation and not merely a severe loss of
temper. 313 To do this, the government will be forced to introduce
evidence of more remote speech showing the defendant's history of
homophobia or moral outrage against homosexuals. The fact that many
crimes proscribed by the Hate Crimes Prevention Act may occur
spontaneously and the fact that subjective motivation will often be
difficult to prove, makes intrusive investigation into defendants' past
statements likely.
Therefore, the chilling effect is not merely
conjectural or speculative as the Court held in Mitchell.314 Ordinary
people will have genuine reason to fear that their statements may be
used against them in future prosecution. This substantial possibility is
significant in light of the Court's heightened sensitivity to the chilling

311. Stalder, 630 So. 2d at 1076-77.
312. Id. at 1076.
313. Fleisher discussed a real life example of such a situation:
The defendant, Shannon Siegel, a white high-school student, attends a party at
which he is intoxicated. He becomes angry and uses racial epithets when he
sees the victim, who is black, speaking with his former girlfriend, who is white.
He had already known that the two were seeing each other. The victim and the
defendant had previously socialized together among a racially-mixed group of
students. It was common for these students to use racial epithets when bantering
with each other. The defendant's feelings of rage and humiliation intensify
when a group of the guests forces him to leave because of his boorish conduct.
Later that evening, the defendant, aided by four of his friends, stalks and
brutally attacks the victim with a baseball bat.
Fleisher, supra note 298, at 14 (citing Michael Alexander, "INever Hit Him;" Suspect in EwellAttack
Says Black Youth Was Friend, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 19, 1992, at 4). At trial, the central issue
became whether the defendant had selected the victim based on race or whether his real motivation
was jealousy and humiliation, making his use of racial epithets merely reflective of such emotion. Id.
at 15. The issue was further complicated when the defendant's father testified that many of the
defendant's close friends were black. Id. at 16. Weinstein also discussed an example of this situation:
the defendant and his next door neighbor, a homosexual, finally came to blows after a series of
disagreements about grass clippings left on the defendant's property, and over the course of the fight,
the defendant called the neighbor a "faggot" and a "queer." Weinstein, supra note 283, at 382 (citing
In re Joshua H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 291, 293-94 (1993)). The issue was whether the defendant's
predominant motivation was his neighbor's sexual orientation or anger over repeated disrespect for his
property. Id.
314. See supranotes 110-13 and accompanying text.

2009]

THE CHILL BILL

effect in Black.315
Recent state court decisions regarding statutes similar to House Bill
1592 demonstrate the extent to which prosecutors will delve into
defendants' previous speech and associations to prove bias-motive. In
People v. Lindberg, the California Supreme Court considered a First
316
Amendment challenge to California's penalty enhancement statute.
The penalty enhancement at issue was different from that in Mitchell
and House Bill 1592 in that it applied only to murder. 317 Nevertheless,
the California statute applied the same basic concept by providing for an
automatic sentence of either death or life in prison if the "victim was
intentionally killed because of his or her race, color, religion,
nationality, or country of origin. ' 31 8
The defendant in Lindberg
repeatedly stabbed and murdered Thien Minh Ly, an Asian-American, at
a high school tennis court. 319 To prove that the killing was racially
motivated, the prosecution introduced masses of evidence that the
defendant was an avowed white supremacist. 320
The prosecution
introduced a poster seized from the defendant's bedroom which read:
"Celebrate Martin Luther King Day: If they would have shot four more,
we could have had the rest of the week off from work. ' 32 1 In addition,
the prosecution introduced numerous white supremacist publications
found in the defendant's apartment. 322 Numerous witnesses testified and
recounted bigoted speech that the defendant had used in the remote
past. 323 One witness testified that in the past, the "[d]efendant referred
to Asians as 'gooks' and Hispanics as 'spick[s]' and 'wetbacks.' ' 324 The
prosecution also introduced letters from years past in which the
defendant made derogatory statements, such as "'Dog, its [sic] time to
look in to the future this nation is comming [sic] to a hult [sic] with the
niggers and us. We must choose sides now! '325 The defendant's father
also admitted that his son had a swastika tattoo. 326
Thus, the

315. See supranotes 151-55 and accompanying text.
316. People v. Lindberg, 190 P.3d 664, 672 (Cal. 2008).
317. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(16) (West 2008).
318. Id. (emphasis added).
319. Lindberg, 190 P.3d at 672.
320. Id. at 674-79. Ironically, the defendant himself was not white, but half Japanese and half
Apache Indian. Id. at 679. This paradox may explain in part why prosecutors found it necessary to
collect such an overwhelming amount of evidence as to the defendant's racial biases.
321. Id. at 674-75.
322. Id. at 675.
323. Id. at 677-79.

324. Id. at 677.
325. Id. at 678.
326. Id. at 679.
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prosecution introduced protected speech that the defendant had engaged
in over the period of his life to prove that the killing was racially
motivated. 327 Most of these communications had no close connection
with the criminal act. 328 Nevertheless, the court cursorily dismissed the
defendant's First Amendment challenge to the introduction of this
evidence by citing to Mitchell.329 The court tersely stated, "By its
terms, this provision provides an enhanced penalty for first degree
murder committed because of prohibited bias motivation and is not
directed at free expression protected by the First Amendment. '330 That
brief disposal constituted the full extent of the court's First Amendment
analysis. 331 Moreover, the dissenting opinion failed to even mention
the First Amendment. 332 This decision has not yet produced notable
commentary or controversy. Thus, the case is disturbing both for the
amount of protected speech the prosecution introduced as evidence of
motive and for the apparent complacency of the legal community. If
prosecutions under such state penalty enhancement laws provide any
indication of the potential use of prior speech as evidence, the chilling
effect is real, not conjectural.
V. CONCLUSION

The Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007 poses crucial First
Amendment problems. While not insuperable, these problems require
more careful consideration than either the Court gave in Mitchell or
proponents of the bill now give. While the opponents' fear that
religious leaders who speak out against homosexuality may be subject to
conspiracy or accomplice liability is misplaced, 333 the potential
gathering and introduction of evidence of a defendant's remote
334
protected expression does pose a substantial danger of chilling.
However, Congress can easily cure this potential danger through minor
revisions. Above all, Congress must use more specific language to limit
the potential use of protected speech as evidence. The rule of evidence
provision stating that evidence must be "specifically related" to the

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

See id.
at 674-79.
See id.
at 676-79.
Id. at 692-93.
Id. at 692.
See id.
at 692-93.
See id.
at 704-06 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
See supraPartIV.B.
See supraPartIV.C.
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crime is encouraging but incomplete.335 Loose construction of such
language would render it largely meaningless for the purposes of
mitigating the chilling effect. 336 Rather, Congress should clarify that
only speech that occurred during or immediately prior to the criminal
act is admissible. This strict temporal limit on admissibility would
vitiate any conceivable chilling effect. Even this minor change to the
language of the proposed legislation substantially reduces the risk of
chilling protected speech. 337 In addition, the Supreme Court of the
United States faces a more far-reaching defect in its First Amendment
jurisprudence. The Mitchell decision conflates two unworkable theories
as to why penalty enhancement statutes do not directly regulate speech
based on content. 338 This conflation has increased the danger that
penalty enhancement will chill protected speech because the obscure,
imprecise close nexus principle does not adequately guard protected
speech remote from the substantive crime.
In addition, penalty
enhancement statutes run against the rule announced in R.A.V by
essentially punishing unfavorable speech. 339 The Court might be better
advised to reformulate its jurisprudence and hold that such restrictions
on speech are acceptable because they are narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest-avoiding the social disintegration that occurs
as a result of hate speech. Punishing only that expression actually
directed at the victim would vitiate the necessity of introducing remote
speech as evidence at trial.

335. See H.R. 1592, § 6(a).
336. See supraPart IV.C.
337. For instance, the drafters could alter the rule of evidence provision as follows: In a prosecution
for an offense under this section, evidence of expression or associations of the defendant may not be
introduced as substantive evidence at trial, unless the expression or association is immediately related
temporally, spatially, and causally to that offense. However, nothing in this section affects the rules of
evidence governing impeachment of a witness.
338. See supraPart IV.A.
339. See supranotes 179, 198 and accompanying text.

